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Taking Peacetime Trade Sanctions to the Limit:
The Soviet Pipeline Embargo
by Gary H. Perlow*
I. INTRODUcTION
M any Poles awoke before dawn on December 13, 1981 to hear their
prime minister beseech them not to erect barricades where bridges
were needed.' Mere hours before, tanks encircled the Polish capital and
Solidarity officials were imprisoned. Martial law had become fact. It is an
irony of sorts that the events set in motion that night by General Jaruzel-
ski soon had Atlanticists borrowing his urgent entreaty - for the resul-
tant political and legal controversy over the American use of extraterrito-
rial economic sanctions dangerously strained relations among the allies
and, further, marked a breakdown in Western consensus on managing ec-
onomic relations with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.
In his 1981 Christmas address, President Reagan announced a series
of economic sanctions against Poland as a means of advancing reconcilia-
tion and obtaining the lifting of martial law.2 Days later, as evidence of
Soviet complicity in the Polish crackdown became clear, sanctions were
announced against the Soviet Union "in response to the Soviet Union's
heavy and direct responsibility for the repression in Poland. '3 One of
these measures had been percolating awhile in some quarters of the U.S.
Congress: cessation of American participation in the construction of the
3,500 mile long Yamal natural gas pipeline linking the Urengoi gasfields
in northern Siberia with Western Europe. 4 Acting under Section 6 of the
* Associate, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom; J.D., Columbia (1977); B.A., Cor-
nell (1974). The research for this article was completed in December 1982.
1 THE EcONOMIsT, Dec. 19, 1981, at 19, col. 1.
2President's Christmas Address and Statement on the Situation in Poland, 17 WEEKLY
Comp. PREs. Doc. 1404 (Dec. 23, 1981). The sanctions included curtailment of high-technol-
ogy trade and export credits as well as restrictions on fishing and aircraft landing rights. Id.
at 1406.
3 47 Fed. Reg. 141 (1982) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. §§ 379.4, 385.2, 399.1-2).
4Id. The natural gas pipeline project had been under discussion for a number of years.
The key West European participant, West Germany, had approved the project in July 1980.
President Carter voiced no objection at the time. However, the Reagan Administration from
its outset was against it for a number of political, economic and military reasons. Opposition
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Export Administration Act of 1979 (the EAA),5 the U.S. government, for
the first time, embargoed U.S. products and technology for oil and gas
transmission equipment destined for the Soviet Union.'
The shipment of General Electric rotors to European turbine manu-
facturers was halted.7 Given the limited supply of the rotors in Europe
delivered prior to the December sanctions, the pipeline project faced seri-
ous, though not fatal, delay. Other sources for rotors and turbines could
be found. Tellingly, the Soviet Union itself was reported developing a ro-
tor manufacturing capability in a Leningrad plant.8
Debate on the pipeline sanctions intensified as the winter length-
ened. The Administration's dominant concern shifted from the lifting of
martial law to one affecting the very nature of East-West economic rela-
tions. Proponents of a more coordinated and harmonious policy with the
Europeans lost ground to those who sought an opportunity to exploit the
perceived Soviet economic vulnerability by restricting Soviet hard cur-
rency earnings and thus forcing the Russians to make even harder choices
regarding the allocation of resources to their military.9
was expressed at the July 1981 economic summit conference in Ottawa. The West Germans,
though, found Reagan's proposals for alternate energy sources inadequate. Contracts for the
supply of pipeline equipment were signed by European and American concerns prior to the
December pipeline sanctions.
5 The Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96072, 93 Stat. 503 (1979) (codi-
fied as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420) [hereinafter cited as EAA]. Section 6, enti-
tled "Foreign Policy Controls" authorizes the President to prohibit exports for foreign pol-
icy purposes. See infra notes 25 and 26 and accompanying text.
6 47 Fed. Reg. 141 (1982) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. §§ 379.4, 385.2, 399.1-2). Previ-
ously, President Carter had prohibited the export of oil and gas exploration and production
equipment destined for the Soviet Union as a consequence of its invasion of Afghanistan.
See 43 Fed. Reg. 33699 (1978) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. §§ 379.4, 399).
7 The American-manufactured rotors were a key component in the gas turbines that
drive compressors which pump the natural gas from one compressor station to the next
along the length of the pipeline. Turbines were being manufactured in Europe under license
from General Electric.
8 THE ECONOMIST, June 26, 1982, at 52, col. 3.
During the Kennedy Administration there was an episode where the United States
sought to block a Soviet-West German pipeline venture by forcing cancellation of West Ger-
man contracts for the supply of wide-diameter pipe. The effort succeeded in Bundestag, but
only by a whisker. George Ball, Under Secretary of State at the time, relates that the Soviet
Ambassador to Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin, told him a year or two later, "I wish to
thank you on behalf of my Government. When you got the Germans to renege on their
contracts, you forced my country to do what we should have done long before - build
facilities to make wide-diameter pipe. Now we're independent of the world. So we're grate-
ful to you." Ball, The Case Against Sanctions, N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1983, § 6 (magazine),
at 120, col. 3.
9 Though policy makers were split on the issue of sanctions, the rift was not total. All
sides were troubled by certain elements of the pipeline project. The below market financing
terms arranged for the sale of pipeline equipment to the Soviet Union were viewed as thor-
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Despite European assurances to the contrary," concern grew in
Washington that the Europeans would seek to by-pass the pipeline sanc-
tions. Since some General Electric rotors had already been delivered to
John Brown Engineering Co. in the United Kingdom and Nuovo Pignone
S.P.A. in Italy prior to the President's December order, those companies
were capable of assembling at least a portion of the turbines that their
contracts required. Moreover, remaining rotors could well have been
eventually supplied by the newly nationalized Alsthom-Atlantique S.A. of
France, which had had a license from General Electric to manufacture
rotors. French policy on handling the pipeline supply contracts at first
seemed confused, though it soon hardened into one of furthering the con-
summation of all deals in which French companies were participants."1
On June 18, 1982, President Reagan sought to plug the loopholes in
the December sanctions by a dramatic and far-reaching expansion of the
embargo: export controls were to be extended to foreign subsidiaries of
U.S. corporations and to equipment manufactured abroad by foreign
companies under license from U.S. firms even if supply contracts had
been signed with the Soviet Union prior to the imposition of the initial
December sanctions. 2 European indignation exploded. In their view, le-
gitimate American opposition to the pipeline project had now become
outright interference in their sovereign affairs. Moreover, the potential ec-
onomic cost being imposed by the Americans was significant, particularly
in the midst of a severe recession.13 Not surprisingly, European determi-
oughly unwarranted. There was also concern, of course, for the longer term political and
strategic implications of European reliance on the Soviet Union as an energy supplier. Nev-
ertheless, there was a good deal of discord within the Administration. The handling of the
pipeline issue was later to become a cause contributing to the resignation of the Administra-
tion's foremost Atlanticist, Alexander Haig.
10 Western European nations had been either unable or unwilling to formulate a strong,
unified response to the Polish and Soviet actions; no economic sanctions with bite were
imposed individually or collectively within the framework of the European Communities
(EC). Foreign ministers of the ten EC countries did meet on January 4, 1982 and issue a
communique censuring Poland and the Soviet Union and stating an intention not to under-
mine the American sanctions. EC Communique (Jan. 4, 1982). A week later, foreign minis-
ters of NATO countries meeting in Brussels agreed to consider specific diplomatic, scientific
and economic sanctions. NATO Communique (Jan. 11, 1982). No sanctions were adopted at
the NATO meeting, but the foreign ministers affirmed the intention not to undermine the
sanctions of others. Id.
11 THE ECONOMaST, Jan. 16, 1982, at 34, col. 1.
12 President's Statement on Extension of United States Sanctions, 18 WEEKLY Comp.
PREs. Doc. 820 (June 18, 1982). The official purpose of the new measures was, as with the
December sanctions, to force a reconciliation in Poland. Id. The Department of Commerce
published its implementing regulations, 47 Fed. Reg. 27250 (1982) (to be codified at 15
C.F.R. §§ 376, 379, 385).
13 The U.S. Commerce Department estimated that the June restrictions affected about
13 licensees and 7 foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies. Alsthom-Atlantique faced a loss of
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nation to see the pipeline deal through stiffened. 4
Companies soon found themselves caught between the conflicting di-
rectives of determined sovereigns. Penalties for violation were potentially
severe. Dresser (France) S.A. (Dresser-France), a French subsidiary of the
Dallas-based Dresser Industries Inc. (Dresser), was the first to feel the
squeeze as it had the earliest delivery schedule for pipeline equipment. In
a formal requisition order,15 Dresser-France was directed by the French
government to complete the manufacture and delivery of compressors
pursuant to its contract with the Soviet Union, despite contrary instruc-
tions issued indirectly by the United States government through Dresser.
The U.S. Commerce Department reacted swiftly. During the after-
noon of August 26th, the day Dresser-France's compressors were loaded
aboard a ship bound for the Soviet Union under tight supervision by the
French police, an "Order Temporarily Denying Export Privileges" (here-
inafter, a temporary denial order) was issued revoking all export licenses
with Dresser-France and denying "all privileges of participating, directly
or indirectly, in any manner or capacity, in any transaction involving
commodities or technical data exported from the United States. .... ,. e
Soon thereafter, as other companies prepared to ship equipment to the
about $70 million on a contract to supply General Electric rotor kits. AEG-Kanis
Turbinenfabrik (AEG-Kanis), a division of the seriously ailing AEG-Telefunken, stood to
lose DM 650 million on its contract to supply 47 turbines, and over 1,000 jobs were thus
threatened. John Brown's turbine contract was worth $104 million, and Nuovo Pignone's
contract, $700 million. Other companies, including secondary suppliers, faced financial loss.
THE ECONOMIST, July 10, 1982, at 59-60.
,4 A communique issued by the French Prime Minister's office on July 22 stated:
The Government wishes to make it clear that the Ourengoi gas pipeline construc-
tion contracts concluded by French companies must be honored.
The deliveries scheduled for 1982 will therefore have to be effected at the appro-
priate time. The Government cannot accept the unilateral measures taken by the
United States on 18 June. It recalls that this is also the view of its European
Community Partners. Such measures cause the European companies undue com-
mercial prejudice. They are also harmful to the cooperation between the United
States and their allies.
Quoted in Motion to Vacate Temporary Denial of Export Privileges and Memorandum
in Support, Aug. 27, 1982, at 7 n.1. In the Matter of Dresser (France) S. A., Case No. 632,
before the U.S. Dep't of Comm., Int'l Trade Administration. Italy also made a formal an-
nouncement, and Britain and West Germany expressed objections to the unilateral actions
of the United States which affected their economies. N.Y. Times, July 25, 1982, at 1, col. 3.
On August 10, 1982, the EC delivered a diplomatic note and filed a protest with the Com-
merce Department. See European Communities, "Gas Pipeline - Comments of the Euro-
pean Community As Regards the Measures Taken By The US Government," Brussels, Aug.
12, 1982, Rev. 4-10.08.1982 [hereinafter cited as European Communities Comments].
15 R~publique Frangaise, Ministhre de Is Recherche et de l'Industrie, Ordre De Requi-
sition De Services, Aug. 23, 1982.
16 47 Fed. Reg. 38170 (1982). Temporary denial orders are issued under the Department
of Commerce regulation, 15 C.F.R. § 388.19 (1982).
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Soviet Union, President Reagan sought to contain potential political
damage by limiting all temporary denial orders to only oil and gas equip-
ment and technology.17 In any case, Commerce Secretary Baldrige esti-
mated that the denial orders would cost each of Dresser-France, Creusot-
Loire, John Brown and Nuovo Pignone between $75 million and $600 mil-
lion in lost sales over three years, while costing U.S. companies some $600
million.18
Lawsuits were initiated and administrative proceedings were begun
in U.S. fora,19 but with virtually no chance of a swift or adequate resolu-
tion. Diplomatic patchwork was the only effective way out of the deadlock
that had been proving politically and economically counterproductive.
The Americans indicated their willingness to abandon the pipeline sanc-
tions if European commitments could be obtained respecting a tighter
trade and credit policy with the Eastern-bloc. Talks were conducted. Fi-
nally, an agreement was reached, or so it seemed. In a radio address on
November 13, 1981, President Reagan announced the dropping of the
sanctions and the achieving of a "substantial agreement" with the
Europeans to curb credits to the Soviets and to forgo new purchases of
Soviet natural gas while studying alternative energy sources.20 Not sur-
prisingly, even this announcement stirred some controversy between
France and the United States. 2
Though the immediate legal issues have been rendered moot by the
lifting of the sanctions, concern does remain that far-reaching extraterri-
17 47 Fed Reg. 39708 (1982). Administration officials were particularly concerned that
the broad temporary denial orders as applied to Dresser-France and Creusot-Loire S.A.
would severely damage the financially troubled John Brown. Such an occurrence would have
caused considerable embarrassment to one of the President's most valued allies, Prime Min-
ister Thatcher.
"' Wall St. J. Sept. 10, 1982, at 15, col. 1.
19 See Dresser Industries, Inc., et al. v. Baldrige, 549 F. Supp. 108 (D.D.C. 1982). In the
Matter of Dresser (France) S.A., Case No. 632 (U.S. Dept. of Comm., Int'l Trade Admin.,
filed Aug. 27, 1982); Creusot-Loire S.A. v. Badrige, No. 82-2787 (D.D.C. fied Sept. 29,
1982); In the matter of Creusot-Loire S.A., Case No. 633 (U.S. Dept. of Comm., Int'l Trade
Admin., filed Sept. 9, 1982); In the Matter of John Brown Engineering Ltd., Case No. 635
(U.S. Dept. of Comm., Int'l Trade Admin., filed Oct. 1, 1982.
20 President's Radio Address on East-West Trade Relations and the Soviet Pipeline
Sanctions, 18 WEEKLY Comp PREs. Doc. 14 (Nov. 13, 1982); 47 Fed. Reg 51858 (1982).
21 Three hours after President Reagan's address, the French Foreign Ministry declared
that France was "not a party" to the agreement, much to the embarrassment of Reagan.
The French were angry that the President announced the lifting of the sanctions and the
European agreement in the same message, thus creating the appearance of linkage between
the two. France's public position had been that the sanctions were illegal and were to be
abandoned unilaterally regardless of the achievement of any broader agreement. Reagan's
interest was otherwise - he needed to show a quid pro quo to save face. The White House,
needless to say, was angered that France sought to dissociate itself from the accord after
seeming to endorse it throughout the prior week.
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torial sanctions may become an "ordinary" tool of American foreign pol-
icy. Awareness of their underlying legal support, or lack thereof, may be
beneficial to law and policy makers in connection with future invocations
of such coercive measures. Toward this end, the remainder of this article
selectively explores some of the issues relating to the legitimacy of the
pipeline sanctions as amended in June.
H. THE JUNE AMENDMENTS AND DoMEsTic LAW
At the direction of President Reagan, the Department of Commerce
amended the December pipeline sanctions on June 22, 1982.22 These con-
troversial amendments expanded prior controls on the export of equip-
ment and technology used for petroleum and natural gas exploration, pro-
duction, transmission and refinement so as to include, among other
things, the export and reexport of: (1) non-U.S.-origin goods and techni-
cal data by foreign subsidiaries of United States corporations; (2) U.S.-
origin goods and technical data by any foreign corporation; and (3) for-
eign-produced direct products of U.S. technical data by any foreign cor-
poration, regardless of when the data were exported from the United
States, provided that the data were subject to a licensing or other royalty
arrangement.23 Thus, even export arrangements entered into by foreign
companies with the Soviet Union prior to the announcement of any
American pipeline sanctions were adversely affected.
Amidst the international outcry occasioned by the June sanctions,
concern was expressed 24 that the far-reaching application of the Reagan
Administration's sanctions exceeded the bounds of the authority con-
ferred by the enabling law, Section 6 of the EAA. 2' That provision gov-
erns export controls for purposes of foreign policy, as opposed to national
security.26
The question of legitimacy of the June sanctions under domestic law
is initially one of statutory construction. The two principal issues in this
regard are whether, in peacetime, nonemergency situations and for rea-
22 47 Fed. Reg. 27251 (1982) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. §§ 376.12, 379.8, 385.2).
23 Id. at 27251-52.
24 See, e.g., European Communities Comments, supra note 14, at 11-12.
25 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). That section provides, inter alia, that-
[T]he President may prohibit or curtail the exportation of any goods, technology,
or other information subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or exported
by an person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, to the extent neces-
sary to further significantly the foreign policy of the United States.
20 Foreign Policy and national security based export controls are treated separately by
the EAA. Section 5 of the EAA, which was not relied upon as authority for the pipeline
sanctions, concerns export controls for national security purposes. Sections 5 and 6 establish
separate substantive and procedural rules. Compare 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2404 and 2405 (1976
& Supp. IV 1980).
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sons of foreign policy alone: (1) a foreign company controlled by a U.S.
corporation is a person "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,"
so that the executive branch of government is competent to prohibit that
foreign company from exporting even foreign-origin goods and technol-
ogy, and (2) a foreign licensee of technology "subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States" may be prohibited from exporting foreign-origin prod-
ucts of such technology regardless of when, and under what circum-
stances, that technology was transmitted to the foreign licensee. An un-
derstanding of what Section 6 contemplates by persons "subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States is necessary to resolve the first issue."
The phrase is not defined in that provision or in section 16,27 the general
definitional provision of the EAA, nor, for that matter, did Congress give
it definitive meaning in the Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917
(TWEA),28 the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977
(IEEPA),29 or any other statute in which it is found.30 The executive
branch, though, has promulgated regulations under the national emer-
gency authority of the TWEA and the IEEPA specifically defining per-
sons subject to U.S. jurisdiction as including foreign subsidiaries of U.S.
corporations, 1 while in other instances it has not.
3 2
Prior to 1977, nonemergency export restraints did not purport to
reach overseas.33 In December of that year, Congress undertook a major
overhaul of the statutory framework for financial and trade controls.3 4
27 50 U.S.C. app. § 2415 (1980). Section 16 (2) defines "United States person" to be
"any United States resident or national. . . any domestic concern... and any foreign
subsidiary or affiliate (including any permanent foreign establishment) of any domestic con-
cern which is controlled in fact by such domestic concern, as determined by regulations of
the President." The phrase "person" rather than "United States person" is curiously used
in Section 6. The latter is used in the anti-boycott provisions of Section 8.
"8 Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917, § 5(b) (1), 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (1) (1976)
[hereinafter cited as TWEA].
2 International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977, § 203(a)(1), 50 U.S.C. §
1702(a)(1)(supp.V 1981) [hereinafter cited as IEEPA].
80 See Bretton Woods Agreement Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 95-435, § 5(d), 92 Stat.
1051, 1052 (1978) (repealed 1979); United Nations Participation Act of 1945, § 5, 22 U.S.C. §
287c (1979).
831 For an early example, see U.S. Treasury Public Circular No. 18 of March 30, 1942, 7
Fed. Reg. 2503 (1942), which defined the term to include "any corporation or other entity,
wherever organized or doing business, owned or controlled by" U.S. citizens and corpora-
tions, among others.
2 See, e.g., the Rhodesian Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 530.404 (1979)(repealed
1979). See infra note 58. See generally infra notes 49-58 and accompanying text.
The EAA's predecessor statute, The Export Administration Act of 1969, Pub. L. No.
91-184, 83 Stat. 841 (1969) (expired 1979) [hereinafter cited as the 1969 EAA] had author-
ized the Executive only to "prohibit or curtail... exportation from the United States, its
territories and possessions." 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403(b) (1976)(expired 1979).
' War or National Emergency Presidential Powers Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-223,
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The TWEA was restricted to wartime emergency application and the
IEEPA was enacted to pick up the slack by covering peacetime emer-
gency export restraints.3 5 Moreover, the 1969 EAA36 was amended, in
part, by authorizing extraterritorial controls over persons "subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States." 7 Yet Congressional intent with respect
to the full scope of peacetime extraterritorial controls was not made
clear.3 8 One investigator has noted that "the amendment was intended
simply to supplement the newly restricted TWEA by allowing the Presi-
dent to continue exercising the authority over foreign subsidiaries he had
previously exercised under that Act."3 9 Yet the very controls Congress
sought to preserve by amending the 1969 EAA were grandfathered by the
1977 legislation and have since been renewed annually independent of
any authority under the EAA.' 0 Without expressing any clear intention to
do so, Congress left the EAA open to an interpretation, however question-
able, expanding extraterritorial export controls to include peacetime, non-
emergency foreign policy application.
Adding to the uncertainty was the introduction of the term "United
States person" to section 8 of the EAA,41 the anti-boycott provision, in
1977.42 That term broadened the definition of "person ' 43 to include U.S.
residents, nationals and concerns, and any foreign subsidiary or affiliate
Tit. HI, 91 Stat. 1625 (1977).
35 The meaning given "emergency" by the IEEPA is an "unusual and extraordinary
threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the
national security, foreign policy or economy of the United States." IEEPA, supra note 29, at
31701.
38 See supra note 33.
37 Act of Dec. 28, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-223, Tit. III, § 301(a), 91 Stat. 1625 (1977)
(expired 1979). See S. Rep. No. 466, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1977) (the amendment to the
1969 EAA would "confer nonemergency authority under that act to control non-U.S.-origin
exports by foreign subsidiaries of U.S. concerns. Such authority has been exercised under
the emergency authority of section 5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act"); Revision of
Trading with the Enemy Act: Markup Before the House Comm. on International Rela-
tions, 95th Cong., 1st Seas. 7-10 (1977)(statement of Representative Bingham).
See Abbott, Linking Trade to Political Goals: Foreign Policy Export Controls in the
1970s and 1980s, 65 MINN. L. REv. 739, 846 (1981)("The legislative history of this amend-
ment seems to reveal confusion among the responsible members of Congress." Id.)
30 Id. at 846 n. 639.
40 See Act of Dec. 28, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-223, § 101(a)-(c), 91 Stat. 1625. These con-
trols included the Foreign Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ 500.101 - 500.809 (1981),
the Transaction Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ 505.01 - 505.60 (1981), and the Cuban
Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.101 - 515.809 (1981). They have since been
extended four times and are currently in effect.
41 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407 (1980).
42 See The Export Administration Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. 95-52, 91 Stat. 235
(1977).
43 "Person" is defined to include "any individual, partnership, corporation, or other
form of association. . . ." 50 U.S.C. app. § 2415 (1) (Supp. IV 1980).
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of any domestic concern which is controlled in fact by the domestic con-
cern as determined under regulations of the President.44 However, Con-
gress chose not to use this clear grant of extraterritorial authority when
drafting Section 6.
Two years later, in 1979, the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs had an opportunity to clear the confusion, but failed to
do so adequately. In considering the bill that ultimately was to be enacted
as the current EAA, the Committee "withdrew for further study" a pro-
posal that would have prohibited the imposition of new controls on non-
U.S.-origin exports of foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies, except in
international economic emergencies declared pursuant to the IEEPA.45 In
so doing, though, the Committee expressed doubt that the application of
extraterritorial controls to nonemergency situations had been "considered
adequately" by Congress in 1977.8 Certainly, no consideration had been
given to nonemergency, foreign policy-based export restraints. 47 This
shortcoming is all the more conspicuous because controls maintained for
foreign policy purposes had been the most sharply criticized aspect of
United States export control policy.4"
Situations in which the executive branch has instituted economic
controls over foreign subsidiaries of American companies as persons "sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the United States" have typically been of an
"emergency" nature and based, at least in part, on national security con-
siderations. Regulatory examples include the Foreign Assets Controls
" See id. § 2415(2). For a detailed definition of "United States person" by the Depart-
ment of Commerce, see also 15 C.F.R. §.369.1 (1980).
45 S. REP. No. 169, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1979). The committee took note of a letter
from the Department of State, which stated:
This [provision] could prevent controlling exports from subsidiaries in order to
increase the effectiveness of other controls, as was done at the behest of the Con-
gress in the case of Uganda. New situations may arise where the United States
would wish to distance itself from especially abhorrent acts of other Governments
which would not, however, constitute emergencies for the United States. While
controls on exports of subsidiaries have not been imposed pursuant to this Act, we
believe it would be desirable for the President to retain flexibility in the current
legislation.
Id. at 5. With regard to the case of Uganda, see infra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
46 S. REP. No. 169, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1979).
"7 Indeed, even in 1979, the Senate Committee did not distinguish between the national
security and foreign policy bases for nonemergency controls as the Senate bill itself did not
separate the two. See S.737, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); but see the final House version,
H.R. 4034, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 5, 6 (1979). When two distinct provisions were later
adopted in the conference committee, no indication was given whether one would support a
broader extraterritorial reach than the other - other than use of the language "subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States" in both provisions. See H.R& CoNF. REP. No. 482, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 12 (1979).
48 See S. REP. No. 169, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1979).
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Regulations and the Transactions Control Regulations, 49 both instituted
under the TWEA. More recently, the Iranian Assets Controls Regula-
tions"0 were instituted under the IEEPA in response to President Carter's
order seeking to freeze Iranian assets51 to protect, in part, national secur-
ity interests.5 2 The freeze extended to official Iranian property "subject to
the jurisdiction of the United Stdtes or which is in the possession or con-
trol of persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. . . ."Is As
with the Foreign Assets Control Regulations and the Transactions Con-
trol Regulations," this language was defined to include foreign subsidiar-
ies of U.S. corporations. It should be noted that, in addition to the asset
freeze, a general trade embargo was instituted against Iran under the
IEEPA.55 The implementing regulations thereof expressly excluded from
coverage foreign nonbanking subsidiaries.5 ,
In contrast to emergency, national security based regulations, not all
of which have sought to reach overseas,5 7 nonemergency, foreign policy-
based export controls have typically been limited territorially - at least
until the June pipeline sanctions. The Rhodesian sanctions, for example,
did not reach overseas subsidiaries.58 Nor have foreign policy controls in-
49 31 C.F.R. §§ 500 and 505 (1982) repectively. The Foreign Assets Control Regulations
prohibit a range of commercial activity with specified hostile countries, currently North Ko-
rea, Cambodia and Vietnam. 31 C.F.R. § 500.201 (1982). The Transactions Control Regula-
tions prohibit the export of strategic goods with countries that are potential or actual adver-
saries. 31 C.F.R. § 505.10(b) (1982). Both regulations define "person subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States" to include "[a]ny partnership, association, corporation, or
other organization, wheresoever organized or doing business, which is owned or controlled
by" any United States corporation or by any person who is a citizen or resident of the
United States or actually within the United States. See 31 C.F.R. § 500.329 (1982) and 31
C.F.R. § 505.20 (1982), respectively.
o 31 C.F.R. § 535 (1982).
51 Exec. Order No. 12170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65729 (1979).
52 The disorder in that nation represented "an unusual and extraordinary threat to the
national security, foreign policy and economy of the United States." Id.
Id.; 31 C.F.R. § 535.201 (1982).
04 See supra note 49.
65 Exec. Order No. 12205, 45 Fed. Reg. 24099 (1980), revoked by Exec. Order No. 12282,
46 Fed. Reg. 7925 (198i).
31 C.F.R. § 535.207(b) (1980) (repealed 1981).
'I See, e.g., the Cuban Assets Controls Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Pt. 515. Foreign affiliates
of U.S. corporations were permitted to trade with Cuba provided no U.S. citizens or resi-
dents of U.S.- origin goods were involved. 31 C.F.R. § 515.541 (1963)(modified 1975). These
controls were loosened in 1975, though maintained and justified on foreign policy grounds,
as concern over the placement of Soviet offensive weaponry in Cuba waned. See 31 C.F.R. §
515.559 (1981) and 15 C.F.R. § 385.1 (1981).
See The Rhodesian Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 530.404 (1979)(repealed
1979). Although foreign subsidiaries were not included within the definition of persons "sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the United States," the regulations did apply to U.S.-controlled
entities in Rhodesia itself. Id. Citizens and residents of, and persons actually within, the
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stituted under section 6 of the BAA covered exports of non-U.S.-origin
goods by foreign subsidiaries.59 Only in one instance were regulations pro-
posed that would have reached exports of non-U.S.-origin goods by for-
eign subsidiaries on strictly foreign policy grounds. This was the-1978
embargo on exports to Uganda instituted in reaction to the gross abuse of
human rights then taking place there. Congress, by statute, authorized
the embargo, which was implemented by Commerce Department regula-
tions.60 Two months later, President Carter proposed more extensive reg-
ulations61 that would have reached foreign subsidiaries, affiliates and
other foreign establishments "controlled in fact" by U.S. concerns.6 2 How-
ever, Idi Amin was overthrown before the proposed regulations took ef-
fect, and thus they were withdrawn 8 and the special statute repealed. '
The June pipeline sanctions also sought to regulate exports and reex-
ports from one foreign country to another of U.S.-origin goods and tech-
nology as well as foreign-produced goods based on U.S. technology.6 No
prior notice for the sanctions had been given. About a dozen foreign com-
panies thus found themselves faced with new American directives, non-
existent at the time license agreements with American companies and
supply contracts with the Soviet Union were signed.6
The Administration based these controls on the language of Section 6
of the EAA which permits the President to prohibit the exportation of
"goods [or] technology ... subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States. '67 It is clear then that under U.S. law a jurisdictional nexus is
established merely by the geographic origin of goods and technology. The
position taken by the executive branch has been that this nexus is not
broken once exportation from the United States has occurred, or even
United States could not participate in the transactions of foreign subsidiaries with Rhode-
sia. Id. at § 530.307 (1979)(repealed 1979).
3, See, e.g., 15 C.F.R. 385.2(c) (1981)(exports of oil and gas equipment and technology
to the U.S.S.R.); id. 385.2(d)(exports of goods and technology for use in the 1980 Summer
Olympic Games in Moscow); id. 385.2(e)(phosphates to the U.S.S.R.); id. 385.2(f)(truck en-
gine assembly line equipment to the U.S.S.R.); id. 385.4(a)(limited embargo of South Africa
and Namibia); id. 385.4(d)(crime control and certain other equipment to Libya, Iraq, South-
ern Yemen and Syria); and id., 385.4(f)(various equipment and technology to Afghanistan).
" Bretton Woods Agreement Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 95-435, 92 Stat. 1051
(1978)(repealed 1979). For the temporary regulations implementing the embargo, see 43
Fed. Reg. 49304 (1978)(repealed 44 Fed. Reg. 31010 (1979)).
61 43 Fed. Reg. 58571 (1978).
6 See 43 Fed. Reg. 58573 (1978). See 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(c) (1981) for a definition of
"controlled in fact."
See 44 Fed. Reg. 31010 (1979).
" See Act of Sept. 21, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-97, §2, 93 Stat. 415 (1979).
" See 47 Fed. Reg. 27251(1982)(to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 379.8).
"See supra note 13.
67 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(a)(1) (1981).
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upon subsequent reexportation. Thus, even though Section 6 does not au-
thorize controls over the reexport of goods and technology subject to U.S.
jurisdiction, the President acted as' if it had. 8 The government's position
is similar with respect to the regulation of foreign-produced goods based
on technology. The manner in which the June sanctions impose these
types of regulation differs from previous instances where "prior notice" in
the form of requests for written assurances of compliance with U.S. regu-
lations were given by U.S. exporters to the foreign importers.6 9 Even the
December 1981 pipeline sanctions,10 as applicable to foreign licensees,
were premised upon written assurances and did not apply to technology
transmitted prior to the effective date of the regulations.71
In the Dresser litigation7 argument focused on the nature of an "ex-
portation of technology" that could be subject to regulation under Section
6. The particular point at issue was whether the President could curtail
the export from France of compressors produced by Dresser (France) us-
ing technology supplied from the United States. The government's brieP
claimed, somewhat equivocally, that an exportation of technology for pur-
The regulations enacting the June sanctions stated: "As authorized by Section 6 of
the Export Administration Act of 1979, prior written authorization by the Office of Export
Administration is required for foreign policy reasons for the export or reexport to the
U.S.S.R. of oil of gas exploration, production, transmission or refinement goods of U.S. ori-
gin .... ." [emphasis added]. 47 Fed. Reg. 27252 (1982).
"' The Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 368-399 (1981), which regulate
reexports of exported commodities and technical data, prohibit, unless otherwise authorized,
the export to target countries of certain foreign produced direct products of U.S. technical
data, as well as commodities produced by a plant, or containing a major component, which
is a direct product of U.S. technical data - but only in cases where the products are of the
type for which the Export Administration Regulations require written assurances from pro-
spective importers of the technical data. See 15 C.F.R. §§ 379.8(a)(3), 379.4(0, and
379.5(e)(1)-(2) (1981). Failure to obtain a written assurance will not necessarily defeat a
license application. See id. § 379.5(e)(2). These assurances, whether found in license agree-
ments or in some other writing, evidence the obligation of the importer not to ship the
technical data or its direct products to the target countries in contravention of U.S. legal
requirements. The control is thus prospective and contractual in nature. By not requiring
prior assurances or otherwise giving importers prior notice of restrictions, the June pipeline
sanctions were quite extraordinary. In at least one instance, the Department of Commerce
has imposed prohibitions on the reexport of U.S.-origin goods after the goods had been
exported from the U.S. See 46 Fed. Reg. 44803 (1981) (prohibiting foreign persons from
transferring any U.S.-origin goods or technology to United African Airlines, a Libyan
airline).
70 President's Statement of U.S. Measures Taken Against the Soviet Union Concerning
its Involvement in Poland, 1981 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRasmrrs 1209 (Dec. 29, 1981).
71 See also 43 Fed. Reg. 33699 (1978); 43 Fed. Reg. 7311 (1978).
72 See supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text.
7 3Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion For a
Preliminary Injunction, Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Baldrige, 549 F. Supp. 108 (D.C. Cir.
1982) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum of Points].
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poses of Section 6 occurs as long as the foreign firm in question is li-
censed to use the technology - ergo, "the June regulations curtail the
exportation of technology by barring foreign licensees of U.S. technology
from shipping products of that technology to the USSR." 4 The theory
underlying the government's argument was not made explicit. Presuma-
bly, it was either that use of U.S. technology by a foreign licensee or.that
the export from abroad of the foreign-made products of that technology,
is tantamount to an exportation of technology from the United States
and thus prohibitable.
Either rationale for the government's position is weakened by a
straightforward definitional analysis. "Technical data," as defined in ad-
ministrative regulations, means: ".... information of any kind that can be
used, or adapted for use, in the design, production, manufacture, utiliza-
tion, or reconstruction of articles or materials. '7 5 The "export of technical
data" has been defined as: "(i) an actual shipment or transmission of
technical data out of the United States; (ii) any release of technical data
in the United States with the knowledge or intent that the data will be
shipped or transmitted from the United States to a foreign country; or
(iii) any release of technical data of U.S.-origin in a foreign country. 76
Exportation of technical data is thus seen as an event that occurs upon
the transmission or release of information,7 7 rather than a continuous
state existing for the duration of a licensing agreement. It would also be
difficult to argue that the export of foreign-made products of U.S. tech-
nology from a foreign country is an export of U.S. technology given the
meaning of the statute and the distinct statutory definitions for products
and technology in the EAA.78 Nor could a case be persuasively made that
such action is a reexport of U.S.'technical data.79
Should the more controversial reaches of the June pipeline sanctions
be deemed unsupportable under the EAA, they might seek their legitima-
tion under the President's independent foreign affairs authority rooted in
the Constitution. The United States Supreme Court has recognized and
described this authority as:
74 Id. at 48.
75 15 C.F.R. § 379.1(a) (1982). Though used in the June regulations, the term is not
defined in the EAA. The EAA does define "technology," similarly, as: "[T]he information
and know-how that can used to design, produce, manufacture, utilize, or reconstruct goods,
including computer software and technical data, but not the goods themselves." 50 U.S.C.
app. § 2415(4) (1981).
78 15 C.F.R. 379.1(b).
77 A release of technical data occurs upon visual inspections, oral exchanges of informa-
tion or the application abroad of personal knowledge or technical experience acquired in the
United States. See 15 C.F.R. § 379.1(b)(2) (1982).
78 50 U.S.C. app. § 2415(3)-(4) (1981).
79 See 15 C.F.R. 379.1(c) for a definition of "reexport of technical data."
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[T]he very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the
sole organ of the federal government in the field of international rela-
tions - a power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act
of Congress, but which, of course, like every other governmental power,
must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the
Constitution."
This "sole organ" power implies a legal authority in the President to as-
sert a variety of actions, not explicitly granted by the Constitution, in the
conduct of U.S. foreign policy.81 As such, it may be said to support a
President's making of foreign policy by asserting rights and assuming du-
ties on behalf of the United States, by responding to the claims of others,
by announcing U.S. attitudes, intentions and doctrines and even in some
situations by domestic legislation.
Nevertheless, the President's power as "sole organ" is viewed, in
principle, as being limited by exclusive constitutional grants of power to
Congress.8 2 And Congress does have the power "[tio regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations ... ."83 The question then arises whether Congress'
clear grant is an exclusive one. Professor Louis Henkin has suggested
that:
[I]n principle, it would be difficult for a President to dispute that by
vesting in Congress all legislative powers herein granted and granting it a
comprehensive array of specific powers, the Constitution barred the
President from exercising. these powers even as regards foreign affairs
[footnote omitted]. Whatever then he can do by treaty or other interna-
tional agreement.., he cannot unilaterally regulate Commerce with for-
eign nations .... [footnote omitted]."
However, in its August 1982 report recommending that the EAA be
amended to terminate both the December and June pipeline sanctions,8 5
11 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936). The government
made this argument in the Dresser litigation. See, Memorandum of Points, supra note 72,
at 49-50. See generally, HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONsTrruTION 45-50 (1972) [here-
inafter cited as HENKIN].
81 HENKIN, supra note 80, at 49-50.
'2 The dividing line between Executive and Congressional competence in foreign affairs
is an unresolved issue of constitutional law - having rarely been passed upon by the courts.
There are views that all foreign affairs powers may be exercised by both branches concur-
rently. More extreme is Theodore Roosevelt's "stewardship theory" that all executive power
is limited only by express restrictions found in the Constitution or imposed by Congress
acting under its constitutional powers.
3U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
HENKIN, supra note 80, at 95.
85 HOUSE Comm. on FOREIGN AFFAIRs, EXPORT ADMINISTRATION AcT AmENDMENr, H.R.
REP. No. 762, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). The report concerned the Committee's recom-




the House Committee on Foreign Affairs stated that, "[tihe committee
does not challenge such Presidential authority [to impose extraterritorial
controls], although it is not explicit in the [EAA]." 6 It would be wrong to
imply an admission of non-exclusive Congressional authority from this
statement, but it is nonetheless surprising that the House committee did
not choose to question the President's authority much less decry a usur-
pation of "exclusive authority" in the context of a report highly critical of
the pipeline sanctions. Taken in conjunction with overall Congressional
silence on the matter, it could reasonably be inferred from the circum-
stances that Congress either "tacitly delegated" the controversial author-
ity to the President or "tacitly acknowledged" the President's "sole or-
gan" authority.81
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW
As a matter of national judicial practice, whenever a law of the
United States lends itself to one interpretation consistent with interna-
tional law and another violative, the law is interpreted in a manner con-
sistent with international law.88 In the words of Chief Justice Marshall,
"[A]n act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of
nations, if any other possible construction remains .. ."9 In considering
vague or general statutory language, U.S. courts ordinarily presume that
Congress intended the regulation in question to apply within the parame-
ters of international law unless, of course, a clear Congressional intent is
evident that the law be applied otherwise.90
The language and legislative history of Section 6 of the EAA are suf-
ficiently ambiguous as to create doubt whether Congress desired the law
to be applied regardless of international legal limitations. Whether the
argument that Congress did intend the EAA to be upheld in contraven-
tion of international law could prevail over the judicial presumption of
86 Id. at 6.
"Regarding the view that Congressional silence authorizes the states to regulate inter-
state commerce in certain cases, see, e.g., Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 768
(1945), citing Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 VA. L. REv. 1 (1940);
HpEN, supra note 80, at 235.
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) of FOREIGN RE. § 3(3) (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATE-
MENT (SEcoND)].
83 Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
90 There is no provision in the U.S. Constitution prohibiting Congress or the President
from violating international law. On the other hand, there are no Supreme Court opinions,
or explicit dicta, upholding the power of the President to violate international law. See HEN-
KIN, supra note 80, at 460 n.61. Courts have enforced the precepts of international law
against lower executive officials when they had not been directed by the President to disre-
gard international law. Id. at 222. See also The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
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international legality is not clear.9 1 If it could not prevail, the June sanc-
tions might be invalidated on the domestic plane if they violated interna-
tional law, unless they could rest on the President's elusive foreign policy
power as "sole organ."92 If the presumption were overcome, or if the sanc-
tions were deemed a legitimate exercise of Presidential power, and a U.S.
court ruled that the regulations were valid as a matter of domestic law,
regardless of any violation of international law, the United States would
still be responsible on the international plane for any of its transgres-
sions.08 Accordingly, in either case, an examination of the June sanctions
in light of public international law would be in order. At the heart of such
an examination lies the issue of jurisdiction.
According to the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law,
"Action taken by a state in prescribing or enforcing a rule that it does not
have jurisdiction to prescribe or jurisdiction to enforce, is a violation of
international law . . . ,,s, A state's assertion of jurisdiction should at the
very least rest on one of the several recognized bases on which jurisdic-
tion can be founded under international law. These bases are commonly
understood to be the territoriality,9 5 nationality" and protective princi-
ples.9 The territoriality principle is the most widely accepted jurisdic-
tional base as it is a natural consequence of territorial sovereignty. It
holds that a state has jurisdiction with respect to conduct that occurs
9 "The American Law Institute suggests that the application of U.S. law to foreign sub-
sidiaries, "being exceptional in character, is not to be presumed in the absence of clear
intent by Congress expressed or fairly implied. Such 'intent will not' be presumed on the
basis of general legislation or of such phrases as 'the interstate and foreign commerce of the
United States."' RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF FOREIGN REL. § 418 comment g (Tent. Draft
No. 2, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Tent. Draft No. 2].
92 See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
93 See generally, BROWNLiE, PRINCIPLES of PUBLIC INTEREST LAW at 36-38 (2d ed. 1973).
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 88, at § 8. See also Case of the S.S. "Lotus,"
(France v. Turkey)) 1927 P.C.LJ. Sec. A., No. 10.
The RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) distinguishes two types of jurisdiction: prescriptive and en-
forcement. Jurisdiction to prescribe is "the capacity of a state under international law to
make a rule of law." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) supra note 88, at § 6, comment a. Jurisdiction
to enforce is the "capacity of a state under international law to enforce a rule of law." Id. A
third type of jurisdiction articulated in the RESTATEMENT (REvISED) OF FOREIGN REL. §401
(2)(Tent. Draft No. 3, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Tent. Draft No. 3], is the concept of adju-
dicatory jurisdiction which relates to a state's authority to make particular things or persons
(or classes of persons or things) amenable to its judicial process, whether on governmental
or private initiative, and whether for 'enforcement' or for other purposes. Tent. Draft No. 3,
Pt. IV, Ch. 1, Introductory Note, at 88. It should be noted that as of this writing, neither
Tent. Draft No. 3 nor No. 2 has been finally approved by the American Law Institute.
93 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 88, at §§ 10-19.
Id. at §§ 26-32.
- Id. at § 33.
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within its territory and to things located within its territory.es An expan-
sive view of this principle embraces the theory of objective territoriality,
which confers jurisdiction when a constituent element of proscribed con-
duct occurs within the proscriber's territory.9 In line with this objective
theory, U.S. courts have applied the "effects" doctrine in order to justify
regulations, particularly in the antitrust100 and securities 01 areas, which
attach legal consequences to extraterritorial conduct that causes a direct,
foreseeable and substantial effect within U.S. territory.10 2 The nationality
principle also provides a basis for jurisdiction over extraterritorial acts. In
this case the connection is allegiance to the sovereign by virtue of nation-
ality.10 3 A special exception to the requirement of a territorial or national-
ity basis for jurisdiction is created by the protective principle. This prin-
ciple supports jurisdiction over aliens whose conduct outside the territory
threatens state security.'" Such conduct could include violations of a
state's political, economic, currency or immigration laws. The Restate-
ment (Second) adds the proviso that such conduct should be "generally
recognized as a crime under the law of states that have reasonably devel-
oped legal systems."11 5
A subjective principle of territoriality clearly has no relevance to the
extraterritorial application of the pipeline sanctions. Moreover, an objec-
tive theory, such as the "effects" doctrine, cannot be relied upon here
because the prohibited conduct does not have the necessary direct, sub-
stantial and foreseeable effect within U.S. territory. Resort to the protec-
tive principle would seem precluded, since the June sanctions were based
expressly on foreign policy considerations. One might still argue from the
98 Id. at §§ 10, 17.
9 Id. at § 18.
100 See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945);
Montreal Trading Ltd. v. Amax Inc., 661 F.2d 864 (10th Cir. (1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct.
1634 (1981); Note, Extraterritorial Application of the Anti-Trust Laws, 69 HARv. L. Rzv.
1452 (1956); Oliver, Extra-territorial Application of United States Legislation Against Re-
strictive or Unfair Trade Practices, 51 AM. J. INT'L L. 380 (1957).
101 See, e.g.., Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied
sub nom. Bersch v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 423 U.S. 1018 (1975); Leasco Data Processing
Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
102 The "effects" doctrine is not universally accepted. In fact, past assertions of extra-
territorial jurisdiction on the basis of the doctrine have caused considerable friction between
the United States and its European allies. In some instances, countries have passed legisla-
tion counteracting perceived overreaching by U.S. regulations.
103 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), supra note 88, at § 26. In some private law matters the
connection has been deemed established by domicile and residency. The nationality princi-
ple does not grant a state jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences
to conduct of an alien outside its territory merely on the ground that such conduct affects
its nationals. Id. at § 30(2).
10 Id. at § 33(1).
105 Id.
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standpoint of a broad conception of the protection needed to ensure state
security. Yet even so, supplying pipeline and related equipment and tech-
nology for the development of a potential adversary's energy resources
during peacetime is not a generally recognized criminal offense of the sort
contemplated by the Restatement (Second)'s formulation of the protec-
tive principle. The nationality principle then would seem to be the most
appropriate jurisdictional basis upon which certain aspects of the extra-
territorial application of the June sanctions could be justified.
Determination of corporate nationality differs under the European
and U.S. legal systems. U.S. domestic law generally assigns nationality to
a corporation on the basis of its place of incorporation. European nations
tend to favor the view that the place from which a corporation is man-
aged or directed (the siege social) determines nationality. In wartime or
when national security is at issue, however, both the United States and
the Europeans look to the siege social or the nationality of the corpora-
tion's stockholders.106
In general, the law of corporate nationality has been developing to
allow a broader regulation based on nationality analogues. This is re-
flected in Tentative Draft No. 2 to the Restatement which comments
that "states may treat as the equivalent of nationality, a) that the shares
of a corporation are substantially owned by nationals of the state; b) that
the corporation is managed from an office within the state, or c) that the
corporation has a principal place of business in the state."'' 07 Apparently
then, in recent years, the overseas regulation of foreign subsidiaries has
been enjoying an increasing legitimacy. Indeed, Tentative Draft No. 2
recognizes that "the United States has jurisdiction to apply its law to cor-
porations (or similar judicial entities) organized under the laws of a for-
eign state that are substantially owned or controlled by nationals of the
United States (including corporations organized under the laws of the
United States)." 08 This authority, however, is made subject to a strict
limitation based on reasonableness.109
Tentative Draft No. 2 in effect codifies the limiting principle of rea-
sonableness with respect to the exercise of jurisdiction over foreign sub-
sidiaries (or any type of extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction, for that
matter). This marks a development in the law of foreign relations that
departs significantly from the Restatement (Second).10 As reflected in
108 See Tent. Draft No. 2, supra note 91, at § 216, Reporter's Notes No. 5.
107 Id. comment d.
108 Tent. Draft No. 2, supra note 91, at § 418(2).
109 Id.
110 Underlying this "reasonableness" limitation is the realization that states often have
concurrent jurisdiction to prescribe or enforce rules. Concurrent assertions of jurisdiction
may yield jurisdictional conffict since rules may be prescribed that require~mutually incom-
patible conduct on the part of the same party.
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the Restatement (Second), the question U.S. courts typically have ad-
dressed in the face of jurisdictional conflict has not been one of lack of
jurisdiction, but rather the desirability of exercising that jurisdiction
when considerations of hardship or comity were paramount."' Instead of
separating the issues of jurisdictional authority and propriety, Tentative
Draft No. 2 links them, thereby demonstrating that an exercise of juris-
diction founded on a generally accepted jurisdictional basis may nonethe-
less be unlawful if it breaches the principle of reasonableness. " 2
The primary factual connections supporting a claim of jurisdictional
authority lie with the state in which the corporation in question is doing
business.1 s An attempt by a country to regulate the activity of a foreign
subsidiary by internationally unpopular and untraditional means and for
"I RESTATEMENT (SEcOND), supra note 88, at § 40, Reporter's Note 1.
At the time the RESTATEMFT (SEcoND) was drafted in 1965 there was no rule of inter-
national law for choosing among competing claims of jurisdiction. Id. at § 37 comment a.
Under the RESTATEMENT (SECOND), jurisdictional conflict per se does not preclude a state
from exercising jurisdiction when a basis exists under international law. Id. at § 39. Instead,
states are required to consider moderating, in good faith, the exercise of their enforcement
jurisdiction in the light of certain factors whenever a jurisdictional clash produces conflict-
ing directives. These moderating factors include the vital national interests of each of the
states, the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions
would impose upon the person affected, the extent to which the required conduct is to take
place in the territory of the other state, the nationality of the person affected, and the ex-
tent to which enforcement by action of either state can reasonably be expected to achieve
compliance with the rule prescribed by that state. Id. at § 40.
Well-known U.S. cases applying a "balancing of interests" test to jurisdiction conflict
resolution include, Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976)
and Mannington Mills v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d. Cir. 1979). See generally,
Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction At a Crossroads: An Intersection Between Public and
Private International Law, 76 Am. J. INT'L L. 280, 291-300 (1982).
"S Tent. Draft No. 2, supra note 91, at § 403 sets forth the following as factors to be
considered in determining reasonableness:
(a) The extent to which the activity (i) takes place within the regulating state, or (ii)
has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the regulating state;
(b) the links such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between the regulating
state and the persons principally responsible for the activity to be regulated, or between
that state and those whom the law or regulation is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to the
regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the degree to
which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the regula-
tion in question;
(e) the importance of regulation to the international political, legal or economic system;
(f) the extent to which such regulation is consistent with the traditions of the interna-
tional system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity,
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by other states.
H31 Tent. Draft No. 2, supra note 91, at § 418, comment c.
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reasons less pressing than national security and in the face of vigorous
opposition by the state in which the corporation is incorporated and do-
ing business114 cannot be but unreasonable within the meaning of Tenta-
tive Draft No. 2.115 By modern standards then, that portion of the June
pipeline regulations dealing with overseas subsidiaries is invalid as a mat-
ter of international law.
Little has been said thus far about jurisdictional claims based on the
origin of goods and technical data because there is little that can be said.
There is no accepted jurisdictional basis supporting such controls. In a
creative spirit, goods and technical data could be analogized to nationals,
or perhaps even bits of territory; but no matter how the imagination is
turned, these measures are truly extraordinary. As such, they too could
not survive a test of reasonableness given the facts and circumstances
surrounding the pipeline embargo.
IV. CONCLUSION
The President's authority to institute the wide-ranging pipeline sanc-
tions of June 1981 rests on questionable legal grounds. The relevant stat-
ute, the EAA, neither expressly authorizes some of the more controversial
controls, nor does it deny them. Legislative history and past experience
with the statute cloud as well as illuminate. One could imagine, however,
a domestic court finding the sum of Presidential authority derived from
the EAA and the more elusive foreign affairs power as "sole organ" (and
further supported by Congressional acquiescence) sufficient to confer le-
gitimacy to the June pipeline sanctions - at least under domestic law.
Under international law, there is little doubt as to the illegality of the
measures as applied to foreign companies in France, Italy, West Germany
and the United Kingdom.
114 See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
x" Even if an exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable, it can be rendered unreasonable "if
it requires a person to take action that would violate a regulation of another state which is
not unreasonable. . . ." § 403(3) Tent. Draft No. 2, supra note 96 (the reasonableness of all
states' regulations being measured by the section 403(2) factors).
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